When eMudhra’s roots were distrusted in October 2026 (Mozilla bug 2083449), browsers updated on their own. A lot of HTTPS on a dev machine doesn’t go through a browser, though: Node, Python and curl each have their own copy of the roots. On the machines I checked, Node’s bundled roots and the macOS /etc/ssl/cert.pem still contained the affected roots.
trust-store-audit checks all of them in one command, matching by SHA-256 fingerprint rather than by name:
./trust-store-audit audit # eMudhra 2026 preset, read-only
./trust-store-audit audit --live # also try TLS to the published test hosts
./trust-store-audit fix /etc/ssl/cert.pem --expect 2 --apply
It covers the Debian/Ubuntu bundle, macOS cert.pem and the System Roots keychain, certifi, Node’s bundled roots and Java cacerts. Fix mode works on PEM bundles. It is a dry run unless you pass --apply, backs the file up first, and aborts unless exactly the expected number of certificates is removed. It also writes an undo script and only uses sudo with --apply. Node compiles its roots into the binary, so the fix there is --use-openssl-ca (a snippet appends it to NODE_OPTIONS once). One gotcha: tls.rootCertificates keeps listing the bundled roots even with that flag, so check it with --live.
It uses only the Python standard library and bash. The tests use self-signed fixture certificates and no network. One surprise from CI: unpatched hosted Ubuntu and macOS runners flagged the roots in nearly every store, including Java and the macOS keychain.
Repo (MIT): GitHub - leighsrodney-prog/trust-store-audit: Audit Linux/macOS trust stores (system, keychain, certifi, Node, Java) for distrusted root CAs by SHA-256; safe removal with backup and undo. · GitHub. Feedback is welcome, especially on other stores worth covering (Windows, Go, Docker base images).