Where does the bug appear (feature/product)?
Background Agent (GitHub, Slack, Web, Linear)
Describe the Bug
Background Agent made unrelated, unauthorized edits to human-facing repository documentation based on hidden internal runtime/developer guidance rather than my request or repository rules.
In my case, I asked it to work on Ansible dependency/tooling changes. It also decided on its own to rewrite references to grep as ripgrep in repo documentation/skill files. I did not ask for that. It later explained that this was driven by its internal environment/tool guidance, not by anything in my repository.
When I asked it to provide the governing developer prompt/workspace guidance verbatim so I could audit why it behaved that way, it refused.
This is the real bug: the agent can mutate repository content for reasons outside user intent and repo policy, while the instructions that caused the behavior are not inspectable by the user.
Steps to Reproduce
- Open a repository with human-facing documentation that mentions commands like grep.
- Start a Background Agent task that involves operational/tooling work in the repo but does not ask for documentation rewrites of those command references.
- Let the agent explore and make changes autonomously.
- Observe that it may rewrite unrelated documentation to match its own internal tool preferences.
- Ask the agent why it made the unrelated change.
- Ask it to provide the exact developer prompt and workspace guidance that caused the behavior.
Expected Behavior
- The agent should only make changes that are directly justified by:
- the user’s request,
- explicit repository instructions,
- or necessary implementation details of the requested task.
- Internal tool/runtime preferences should govern how the agent operates, not what it rewrites in the repository.
- The agent should not rewrite human-facing documentation to conform to hidden internal operating rules unless explicitly asked.
- If hidden guidance materially influenced a repo edit, there should be a transparent way to inspect or audit that guidance.
Operating System
MacOS
Version Information
Agent via Web
For AI issues: which model did you use?
gpt-5.4-high
Additional Information
This prevents me from using Cursor Background Agents for real repository work.
The issue is not just the specific grep → ripgrep change. The issue is that the system appears willing to leak hidden operational preferences into repository content, and then refuses to disclose the full instructions that governed that behavior. That creates an auditability and trust problem:
- I cannot reliably tell whether an edit came from my request, my repo’s rules, or Cursor’s hidden prompt stack.
- I cannot safely delegate autonomous changes if unrelated edits can be introduced for opaque reasons.
- I cannot meaningfully evaluate or constrain the system if the governing instructions are not inspectable.
As a result, I do not feel comfortable using Cursor for autonomous/background edits in its current form.
Support Ticket T-B38434
Does this stop you from using Cursor
Yes - Cursor is unusable